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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. JUDICIAL REFORM
Under article V of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895,1
the legislature had created "a hodgepodge of courts, lacking in
uniformity and consistency."' This jumble consisted of various
county courts, municipal courts, and other courts inferior to the
circuit courts with overlapping jurisdiction. The new article V,
the Judicial Reform Amendment, was designed to rectify this
situation.' Ratified on April 4, 1973, it was a clear "directive of
the people that the court system 'shall be vested in .a unified
judicial system.' "" Section 22 of the new article allowed courts
in existence at the time of ratification of the new article to re-
main until article V could be put into effect through legislation.5
A week before ratification of article V, the General Assembly
passed Act No. 503 which was in accord with article V, section
22. It provided that: "All courts in existence in this State on the
effective date of the ratification of article 5 of the State Consti-
tution . . . shall continue in existence, with all the powers and
duties vested in them prior to such ratification . . . .
In this context arose the case of State ex rel. McLeod v. Court
of Probate of Colleton County.7 It involved the validity of twenty-
nine statutes which related to various courts throughout the
state. The Attorney General sought a declaratory judgment, con-
tending that the acts violated article V, section 1 because they did
not further the goal of a unified judicial system. Twenty-five
actions, which were decided together, were classified by the court
into four separate groups:' the first group challenged acts which
1. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. V, § 1.
2. State ex rel. McLeod v. Court of Probate of Colleton County, 266 S.C. 279, 284,
223 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1975).
3. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1 now reads as follows: "Judicial power vested in certain
courts. - The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall
include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction
as may be provided for by general law."
4. Cort Indus. Corp. v. Swirl, Inc., 264 S.C. 142, 146, 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975).
5. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 22.
6. No. 503, [19731 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 868.
7. 266 S.C. 279, 223 S.E.2d 166 (1975).
8. In addition to the four groups of actions there was a complaint against the Civil
and Criminal Court of Darlington County alleging that an act which allowed Judge D.
Carl Cook to serve another term beyond the mandatory retirement age was violative of
both article V, § 1 and article III, § 34, cl. IX. The supreme court found the act "a special
1
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
attempted to alter the jurisdiction of the courts involved; the
second group contested acts which purported to create new local
courts; the third group involved acts creating new judgeships for
courts already in existence at the time of the ratification of article
V; and the fourth group challenged the validity of statutes relat-
ing to several probate courts and one which attempted to create
the office of master in equity for Cherokee County.
In deciding the case, the supreme court relied on three pre-
vious decisions interpreting article V. The first of these, Cort
Industries Corp. v. Swirl, Inc.,' related to the first group of ac-
tions. In Cort the supreme court declared invalid an act, passed
after the ratification of article V, which attempted to divest the
local circuit court of appellate jurisdiction over matters originally
decided in the Pickens County Court. It was argued that section
22 allowed the legislature to alter the jurisdiction of courts in
existence at the time article V was ratified. The supreme court
disagreed. It reasoned that since article V, section 1 required a
unified judicial system and section 22 was included only to make
less chaotic the transition from the old system to the new one, any
piecemeal alteration of the jurisdiction attempted by the legisla-
ture was unconstitutional."
The court in Colleton County thought that the statutes in
group one were similarly infirm. It concluded its discussion of this
group by stating:
Our reasoning in Cort is equally applicable to those statutes in
group one . . . .These courts are not, however, unconstitu-
tional. They continue to exist with the same powers which each
had on April 4, 1973, no more and no less. This is in keeping with
new Article V, § 22, and is consistent with Act No. 503 of March
28, 1973 ..... .The attempted alterations by the several stat-
utes are simply invalid."
Next, the court turned to the second group of statutes which
attempted to create new local courts. State ex rel. McLeod v.
law where a general law could be made applicable" and thus it ran afoul of article III, §
34. The article V issue was not reached. Id. at 293, 223 S.E.2d at 173.
9. 264 S.C. 142, 213 S.E.2d 445 (1975).
10. Id. at 146, 213 S.E.2d at 446. The court added that "[i]f section 22 was allowed
the scope advanced by counsel, the local, factionalized court system would be exhumed
and article V interred. If we were to accept the view advanced by counsel, the mandate
of Section 1 would be rendered a mere hollow formalistic expression of preference for a
uniform system." Id. at 146-47, 213 S.E.2d at 446.
11. 266 S.C. at 287, 223 S.E.2d at 171.
1977]
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Knight'" was controlling. That case involved the validity of a
court created pursuant to an act which permitted, but did not
require, the establishment of a family court for each county. The
act creating the court in question was declared unconstitutional
since it would "indefinitely postpone the implementation of the
directive of the people that the judicial power 'shall be vested in
a unified judicial system.' "'3 The courts in question in the sec-
ond group were "for all practical purposes identical to" the court
in Knight. Thus the acts creating them were likewise proclaimed
to be inconsistent with article V, section 1 of the South Carolina
Constitution.'"
In discussing the acts in group three, which were intended to
create new judgeships for courts existing on April 4, 1973, the
Colleton County court relied on State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and
Criminal Court of Horry County. 5 In that case, an act creating a
judgeship for the Horry County Court was held to be an invalid
attempt to extend the old system in violation of article V, section
1.1 Thus, the analogous acts in group three were held unconstitu-
tional by the court for the same reason."
The fourth group involved the constitutionality of all acts
that either altered the powers of the judge of probate or created
new offices in conjunction with the probate courts of several coun-
ties. The defendants in the fourth group argued that the reason-
ing in Cort, Knight, and Horry County was not applicable to the
probate courts in question. Essentially, their argument was that
the legislature could validly provide for alterations in the powers
of probate judges since the provision was reasonable and applied
equally throughout the state.'8 The supreme court thought the
argument was "not without some appeal," but reasoned that,
since the probate court system had not been unified, "the argu-
ment [lost] its force."' 9 Furthermore, the court stated that these
acts were also invalid because they "would extend the present
non-unified court system by authorizing the addition of associate
12. 264 S.C. 532, 216 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
13. Id. at 534, 216 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1).
14. 266 S.C. at 288, 223 S.E.2d at 171.
15. 265 S.C. 114, 217 S.E.2d 23 (1975).
16. Id. at 117, 217 S.E.2d at 25.
17. 266 S.C. at 289, 223 S.E.2d at 171-72.
18. See Brief for Defendant Klyde Robinson 1-6.
19. 266 S.C. at 291, 223 S.E.2d at 173.
[Vol. 29
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
probate judges to existing probate courts, which are not a part of
a unified court system mandated by new article 5 .12o
Having declared the acts creating the defendant courts un-
constitutional, the court enjoined the courts from further opera-
tion.2' The question of whether the acts of these courts had any
validity remained unanswered. Two months later the supreme
court supplied the answer in a supplemental opinion. 22 The court
determined that, although the courts and judgeships had been
unconstitutionally created, the acts of those courts and judges
were nevertheless valid and binding. This decision was based on
the fact that the now ousted judges had been acting as judges de
facto.23 Such a judge is "defined as one who occupies a judicial
Office under some color of right and for the time being performs
its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in
fact. '2 To justify its decision, the court explained further:
The de facto doctrine is indispensable to the prompt and proper
dispatch of governmental affairs. Endless confusioft and ex-
pense would ensue if the members of society were required to
determine at their peril the rightful authority of each person
occupying a public office before they invoked or yielded to his
official action .... 25
Thus the court rejected the argument that, where there is no
constitutionally created office, there can be no officer, either de
jure or de facto.26 Practical considerations rather than verbal
technicalities swayed the opinion of the court.
II. HOME RULE
A. Local Government
The Home Rule Amendment was ratified by the General
Assembly in March of 1973. Section 7 of that article provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the
structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and the res-
20. Id.
21. Id. at 293, 223 S.E.2d at 174.
22. Id. at 300, 223 S.E.2d at 177.
23. Id. at 303-04, 223 S.E.2d at 178-79.
24. Id. at 301, 223 S.E.2d at 177 (quoting In re Wingler, 231 N.C. 560, 563, 58 S.E.2d
372, 374 (1950)).
25. Id. at 302, 223 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting In re Wingler, 231 N.C. at 565-66, 58 S.E.2d
at 376).
26. 266 S.C. at 305, 223 S.E.2d at 179.
1977]
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ponsibilities of counties, including the power to tax different
areas at different rates of taxation related to the nature and
level of governmental services provided. Alternate forms of gov-
ernment, not to exceed five, shall be established. No laws for a
specific county shall be enacted and no county shall be ex-
empted from the general laws or laws applicable to the selected
alternative form of government.Y
Article VIII, section 7 was thus designed to change the way
counties had been governed since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of 1895.8 However, questions arose as to how much power
had been granted to the counties and how much power had been
retained by the General Assembly. One of these questions con-
cerned the extent to which counties were given authority to tax
within their boundaries. Seemingly the legislature retained some
authority in this area by virtue of article X.29 Section 511] of that
article provides that "[tihe corporate authorities of counties
• . . may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for
corporate purposes . . . . -.0 Section 6 of article X provides that
"[t]he General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any
county or township to levy a tax or issue bonds" except for certain
stated purposes'.3 These provisions suggested that whether or not
counties had power to levy taxes was a question of discretion on
the part of the General Assembly. Thus there was a potential for
conflict between article VIII and article X.
The case of Duncan v. County of York32 dealt partially with
this conflict. In Duncan a York County taxpayer brought an ac-
tion in the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme
Court claiming that Act No. 283 of the 1975 Acts of the General
Assembly33 was violative of article VIII, section 7.14
27. S.C. CONST. art. VIII.
28. See Torgerson v. Craver, - S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 228 (1976); Kleckley v.
Pulliam, 265 S.C. 177, 217 S.E.2d 217 (1975); Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206
S.E.2d 875 (1974).
29. S.C. CONST. art. X.
30. Id. at § 511].
31. Id. at § 6.
32. 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-20 to 1230 (1976).
34. The plaintiff's claim was not restricted to Act No. 283. Also under attack were
Act No. 448 of the Acts of 1975, which provided for a referendum to choose a form of
government for York County, and Act No. 467 of the Acts of 1976, which divided York
County into seven single member election districts. The plaintiff claimed these consti-
tuted "laws for a specific county" which are prohibited by article VIII, section 7. The court
rejected this claim, holding the two acts valid as "one-shot proposition[s]." Duncan v.
County of York, 267 S.C. at 346, 228 S.E.2d at 100-01.
[V~ol. 29
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Act No. 283 had been enacted in order to carry out the man-
date of article VIII, section 7 that the General Assembly establish
alternate forms of government. 5 The act created five forms of
county government among which voters in each county could
choose by way of referendum. Of the five forms, the first four
granted broad powers. 6 Counties choosing the first four forms
could conduct their affairs unfettered by intervention of the Gen-
eral Assembly. The fifth form (board of commissioners), in con-
trast, was given only very restricted powers.37 The board of com-
missioners could not levy taxes or appropriate money; it could
only propose a budget subject to approval, rejection, or modifica-
tion by the General Assembly. The board of commissioners could
not appoint officials to serve on boards, committees, and commiS-
sions; rather the governor was given the authority, subject to the
approval of the county delegation, for such appointments.
The plaintiff objected that these severe limitations on a fifth
form county's ability to govern itself rendered Act No. 283 un-
constitutional. With respect to the power to tax, the plaintiff
claimed that "[u]nder the fifth form, the county governing body
does not have the power to tax. This specifically contravenes
Article VII, Section 7 of the Constitution. ' 38 The plaintiff argued
that the spirit of home rule required that the counties be given
the power to govern themselves and asserted that "[a] county
does not control its own affairs when its budget and tax matters
are in the hands of the General Assembly.
'39
The defendants' answer to this argument was that the Home
Rule Amendment should not be interpreted so broadly. They
argued:
The power to tax different areas within a county at different
rates represents a departure from past practices in regard to the
creation and support of special purpose districts, but it does not
constitute a positive grant of the constitutional power of county-
wide taxation which Article X provides "may" be vested in
county governments. 9
This narrow view of article VII, section 7 was rejected by the
35. 267 S.C. at 338, 228 S.E.2d at 97.
36. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (1976).
37. See id. at § 4-9-1030.
38. Brief for Plaintiff at 32.
39. Id. at 45.
40. Brief for Defendants at 48-49.
19771
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majority. It agreed with the plaintiff that form five was unconsti-
tutional. The General Assembly's retention of this much taxing
power, according to the court, was contrary to "[t]he constitu-
tional intent . . .made clear by § 7, that the local governing
authority shall have the taxing power."'" The court added that
"[niot only does Act No. 283 fail to give the Board of Commis-
sioners, under Form 5, the right to tax at different rates, it gives
to it no right whatsoever to tax.
'4 2
The court had no trouble settling the potential conflict be-
tween article VIII, section 7 and article X. It simply stated that
"Article X deals in generalities, while Article VIII is a specific
mandate."' 3 Since the majority thus found that a broad interpre-
tation of article VIII, section 7 could be harmonized with article
X, it declared unconstitutional the parts of Act No. 283 which
provided for form five.44
The dissent objected strongly to the majority's broad inter-
pretation of article VIII, section 7. It agreed with the defendants
that the Home Rule Amendment was designed only to change the
previously existing practices concerning special purpose districts.
It maintained that "[a]rticle VIII does not constitute a grant of
the constitutional power of county-wide taxation, which Article
X provides may be vested in county governments."4 Interpreting
article VIII, section 7 in this narrow fashion was the only way the
dissenters saw to harmonize it with article X, sections 5 and 6.46
The dissent's primary criticism of the majority's reasoning
was that the majority failed to resolve adequately "the patent
conflict between Article X and Article VIII." It is true that the
majority's interpretation creates a conflict between the two provi-
sions. However, it is also true that the dissent's interpretation
gives rise to a conflict. Article VIII, section 7 clearly gives to the
counties "power to tax different areas at different rates of taxa-
tion;" article X, section 5 just as clearly prohibits such a prac-
tice. "' The dissent argued that, since article X was amended in
41. 267 S.C. at 341, 228 S.E.2d at 98.
42. Id. at 342, 228 S.E.2d at 98.
43. Id. at 342, 228 S.E.2d at 99.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 351, 228 S.E.2d at 103 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 provides in part: "The corporate authorities of counties
.. .may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such
taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction ... .
[Vol. 29
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1973 along with article VIII, and section 5 of article X was left
intact, section 5 of article X and section 7 of article VIII should
be harmonized. But it is impossible to do this. If the uniform
taxation requirement of article X, section 5 is construed to have
current meaning, "the power to tax different areas at different
rates of taxation" is a hollow phrase.
The solution to this dilemma is that article VIII must take
precedence since it is the later expression of the will of the electo-
rate. And, once the dissent's "patent conflict" argument is so
answered, it appears that the majority's construction is the only
reasonable one. It is inconceivable that home rule could have very
much meaning at all unless it means that counties have constitu-
tional power to levy taxes for county purposes. Under the dis-
sent's interpretation of article VIII, section 7, the General Assem-
bly could create up to five forms of county government and give
to none the power to tax. This would result in a return to the
status quo as it existed before the ratification of the Home Rule
Amendment. The local delegations to the General Assembly
would again be all-powerful in their control over local matters. In
reaching the conclusion it did, the court definitely precludes such
an event and, in so doing, gives strong meaning to home rule.49
B. Special Purpose Bonds
The case of Torgerson v. Craver"0 presented, for the second
time in as many years, the issue of whether the General Assembly
could authorize a bond issue to finance the improvement and
maintenance of an airport. A taxpayer had brought a declaratory
judgment action on behalf of herself and all taxpayers and prop-
erty owners in the Charleston County Airport District. She sought
to have a 1975 bond act5' of the General Assembly declared un-
constitutional and to have the issuance of the bonds enjoined.
The district had been created in 1970 and was, at that time,
coterminous with Charleston County. 52 The district was to use the
49. The court's decision is also consistent with S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 17, which
provides: "The provisions of this Constitution and all laws concerning local government
shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers, duties, and responsibilities granted
local government subdivisions by this Constitution and by law shall include those fairly
implied and not prohibited by this Constitution."
50. - S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 228 (1976).
51. No. 219, [1975] S.C. Acts & it. Res. 280.
52. Edisto Beach was removed from Charleston County and annexed to Colleton
County by the General Assembly in 1975. No. 81, [1975] S.C. Acts & t. Res. 88.
19771
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funds obtained from the issuance of the bonds to acquire the
Charleston Airport from the City of Charleston.
Three grounds were advanced upon which the plaintiff urged
the court to base a finding that the bond act was unconstitu-
tional: (1) The act violated article VIII, section 7,53 the Home
Rule Amendment, since it took from the county government the
authority to operate airport facilities; (2) the act violated article
III, section 34, cl. IX,54 since it was a special law where a general
law could be made applicable; (3) the act violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions
since the taxpayers in the district were burdened with the entire
cost of financing facilities which were used extensively by persons
in adjacent counties. Since the supreme court found the act viola-
tive of article VIII, section 7, discussion of the two latter grounds
was omitted.5 The lower court had found no article VIII violation.
It had based its decision on the case of Kleckley v. Pulliam.51 In
that 1975 case the supreme court upheld a bond act which author-
ized a special purpose district, encompassing Richland and Lex-
ington Counties, to raise funds for the improvement of the Col-
umbia Metropolitan Airport. The court construed the Home Rule
Amendment to prohibit only special laws which infringe upon the
governmental functions "set aside for counties." 5 Since the pur-
pose of the act was "not one peculiar to a county,"" but instead,
"one of state concern,"5 it was held that the General Assembly
could create a special purpose district without running afoul of
article VIII, section 7.6o The court in Kleckley thought important
the fact that "[lo a large segment of the population of this
State, the maintenance of the airport is as important as the exist-
ence of an interstate highway" and, since the legislature retains
53. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (adopted 1973). See text accompanying note 27 supra.
54. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 34, cl. IX. "In all other cases, where a general law can be
made applicable, no special law shall be enacted ....
55. The supreme court did not reach the second and third arguments. - S.C. at
- 230 S.E.2d at 230.
56. 265 S.C. 177, 217 S.E.2d 217 (1975).
57. Id. at 183, 217 S.E.2d at 220.
58. Id. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221.
59. Id. at 187, 217 S.E.2d at 222.
60. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished Knight v. Salisbury, 262
S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974), which involved the validity of a special purpose recreation
district within Dorchester County. The basis of the distinction seemed to be that recrea-
tion was "an exclusive function of an individual county" whereas operation of airports was
not. 265 S.C. at 184-85, 217 S.E. 2d at 220. For a discussion of Knight, see Constitutional
Law, 1974 Survey of S.C. Law, 27 S.C.L. REv. 311 (1975).
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the power to maintain the highway system, by analogy, it might
also maintain the Columbia Metropolitan Airport.'
Applying Kleckley to the facts in Torgerson, the trial court
found that "it is impossible to distinguish between the Columbia
Metropolitan Airport and the Charleston Airport."" Conse-
quently, the reasoning in Kleckley was held applicable and the
validity of the bond act accordingly upheld.63
The supreme court reversed. It asserted that the facts in
Kleckley were "entirely different."'" The difference was
that it was absolutely impossible for either the governing body
of Richland County or the governing body of Lexington County
to provide for the bond issue. Kleckley involved a matter with
which only the General Assembly could deal. The bond legisla-
tion was not for a specific county; it was for a region.
The matter at hand involves problems which can be solved
by the local governing body of Charleston County. 5
Thus the majority's reasoning seems to be based on two differ-
ences between the facts in Kleckley and those in Torgerson: Rich-
land or Lexington County could not provide for the bond issue
whereas Charleston County could and the special purpose district
involved in Kleckley was composed of two counties whereas the
district in Torgerson was composed of only one.
By advancing the first of these distinctions, the court sug-
gested that where a county is unable to provide a needed service
of regional importance, home rule does not prevent the General
Assembly from so providing. Certainly this is a plausible limita-
tion on the demand of article VIII, section 7 that "no laws for a
specific county shall be enacted . . . ." However, the Kleck'ley
court never intimated that it was upholding the bond act because
the counties involved could not provide for the bond issue them-
selves.6 Therefore, it appears that, by relying on this first distinc-
61. 265 S.C. at 185, 217 S.E.2d at 221.
62. Record at 37. Among the data upon which the trial court based its finding that
the Columbia Metropolitan Airport was indistinguishable from the Charleston airport
were the following: Charleston Municipal Airport ranks number 73 in size while Columbia
Metropolitan Airport is number 70; the Charleston Municipal Airport is the principal air
transportation facility for a six county area in southeastern South Carolina; approxi-
mately 17% of all South Carolinians use the Charleston airport. Id. at 35-36.
63. Id. at 39. The trial court also found against the plaintiff on her two other claims.
Id. at 37-39.
64. - S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 230.
65. Id.
66. See Constitutional Law, 1975 Survey of S.C. Law, 28 S.C.L. REv. 259, 264-65
19771
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tion, the court was, in effect, reinterpreting Kleckley.
The second distinction relied on by the majority is more
troublesome. While it is true that two counties were involved in
Kleckley and only one in Torgerson, one must question whether
such a distinction was valid for the purposes of article VIII, sec-
tion 7. The dissent took the position that it was not: "The area
taxed does not in itself determine the applicability of Article VIII,
Section 7. Applicability of Article VIII, Section 7 is determined
by the function to be performed.""7 It, like the lower court,
thought that Kleckley was controlling since the facts of the two
cases were otherwise indistinguishable."
This "area taxed" analysis has greater ramifications than the
dissent suggested. That is, if seized upon as an alternative ground
for the majority's holding, it could lead to a result which would
subvert the goals of article VIII, section 7. Merely by creating a
special purpose district composed of more than one county and
labelling the matters dealt with "regional," the General Assem-
bly could encroach upon the powers of the counties involved. This
apparently would not violate the court's interpretation of article
VIII, section 7. It is, of course, possible that the court's language
cannot be stretched so far. After all, with its decision in
Torgerson, the court appears to have steered itself back into the
decentralizing spirit of home rule.
III. DISCRIMINATION
A. Bar Examination
The controversy over the use of tests to determine fitness for
a profession was addressed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Richardson v. McFadden.9 In this case, four black law
school graduates challenged the validity of the South Carolina
Bar Exam, claiming that the test, as applied to blacks, was dis-
criminatory since it was not proven to be job-related. Two of the
appellants, Spain and Kelly, charged in addition that the bar
examiners had failed them when they should have passed.
In order to decide the job-relatedness issue, the court first
(1976), It is interesting to note that the dissent made no mention of the majority's reliance
on this distinction.
67. - S.C. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 232.
68. Id.
69. 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 29
11
Tinkler: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1977
1977] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
had to determine whether to apply the rigorous title VII standard
or to employ the usual equal protection tests. The former stan-
dard, which the appellants advocated, does not require a showing
of discriminatory purpose but merely a showing of racially dispar-
ate adverse impact in order to place the burden on the user of a
test to prove its validity.0 The appellants pointed to the fact that
the Fourth Circuit had previously incorporated the title VII stan-
dard into the equal protection clause in cases where a past prac-
tice of state-sanctioned racial discrimination was combined with
a disparate effect on blacks.71 But the court answered this conten-
tion by citing Washington v. Davis,"2 in which the Supreme Court
limited title VII's application in equal protection cases to instan-
ces where discriminatory purpose was proven.3 Since the appel-
70. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71. The Fourth Circuit had analyzed at least two earlier cases, Walston v. County
School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Chesterfield County School
Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973), using the title VII standard in the context of an equal
protection claim. Walston and Chesterfield County were not the only cases viewing title
VII as the law of the land in equal protection cases. Other circuits had also elevated the
title VII standard to a constitutional level. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir.
1972); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970) (dictum).
72. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
73. In Washington, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Holding that the standards in title VII cases did not
necessarily apply in all equal protection cases, the Court s:.id:
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceed-
ing under it need not concern themselves with the employer's possibly liscrimi-
natory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differenti. 7 impact
of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional
rule. We have nevei held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.
Id. at 238-39. "[I]n our view, extension of the [title VII standard] beyond those areas
where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as the field of public employment,
should await legislative prescription." Id. at 248.
The Supreme Court in Washington expressly disapproved Chance, Castro, Bridgeport
Guardians and Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization, supra note 68, but
failed to mention Walston and Chesterfield County, supra note Cl t26 U.S. at 244-45 n.12.
The Richardson court advanced three possible reasons for the S . preme Court's omission:
1) Inadvertance; 2) implication that discriminatory purpose is established where adverse
racial impact occurs in the context of past discrimination; or 3) implication that school
cases like Walston and Chesterfield County are part of a special context in which the
school system has the burden of justifying its action. 540 F.2d at 747 n.5. The court did
not feel the need to examine the extent to which Walston was affected by Washington
because, in Richardson, there was not sufficient evidence of a history of discrimination.
Id.
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lants could not prove discriminatory purpose,74 the court analysed
the job-relatedness issue under the equal protection clause.
The court was faced with the testimony of the bar examiners
that they had designed the test in a manner that would accur-
ately show whether an applicant possessed "the minimal level of
competence"" needed to practice law in South Carolina. In addi-
tion, experts testified that there was a high correlation between
bar exam performance and law school performance. The appel-
lants contended that such a correlation was irrelevant since job
performance rather than law school performance was what the
bar exam should be designed to test."
The court again turned to Washington v. Davis and quoted
the Supreme Court: "[A] 'positive relationship between the
admission test and training course performance is sufficient to
validate the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to
actual job performance . . . ." Since the South Carolina Bar
Exam met the Washington test and the examiners had made an
effort "to intelligently relate the examination questions to the
skills involved in the practice of law, 71 8 the court held the test
valid under the equal protection clause.
Even though the exam itself passed constitutional muster,
the question whether the passing score was related to a determi-
nation of minimal competency remained to be answered. The
court undertook to answer this question by evaluating the exam-
74. The appellants attempted to prove discriminatory purpose by showing that three
changes in admission practices to the South Carolina Bar had the effect of excluding
blacks. The first was the 1950 elimination of the "diploma privilege" which gave auto-
matic bar admission to graduates of the state's law school. This change corresponded to
the graduation of the first class from South Carolina State, the "separate but equal" black
law school. Second, in 1957, the practice of reading law was terminated just after a black
applicant had gained admission to the bar this way. The third change which the appel-
lants contended was designed to exclude blacks was the elimination of reciprocity after a
black from another state bar gained admission to the South Carolina Bar in this fashion.
The court did not think this circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove discrimi-
natory purpose. It cited the fact that there had never been a state rule barring blacks from
law practice in South Carolina. It noted that South Carolina has the highest proportion
of black bar members in the country. Also, the bar examiners gave neutral reasons for each
of the changes the bar had made in its admission practices. 540 F.2d at 747-48 & n.7.
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 250). The court noted that appellant's
reasoning, if carried to the extreme, would serve to "invalidate almost all state profes-
sional examinations," since, if training school performance is all that is being tested, then
training school graduation itself should be the test. 540 F.2d at 749 n.11.
78. Id. at 749.
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iners' testimony as to the methods they used in grading the tests.
Although different methods were used,79 the court could not de-
termine which one was better designed to arrive at an accurate
evaluation of minimal competency. While expressing doubt
about the "unprofessional approach used by the Examiners,"8
the court held that the equal protection clause was satisfied
"Ifin view of the fact that all Examiners both designed their
exams and assigned scores so as to indicate their judgment as to
minimal competency." 81
In spite of the adverse ruling on the constitutional validity
of the bar exam, two of the appellants prevailed on the ground
that they personally were denied due process and equal protec-
tion in that the examiners had failed them arbitrarily and capri-
ciously. This claim of arbitrary treatment arose from the fact
that, in borderline cases, the examiners made their final assess-
ments by referring to subjective comments they had made on the
grading sheets. Thus an applicant with a lower cumulative aver-
age score, but with more favorable subjective comments than a
second one might pass while the second one might fail. The court
found "reliance on these comments irreconcilable with the
board's contention that numerical scores are used to capture pre-
cise gradations in performance." 2 For this reason, the court held
that appellants Spain and Kelly had been denied due process and
equal protection. Consequently, the court ordered that they be
admitted to the bar.83
In addition to the appeals by the bar applicants, the examin-
ers had appealed the district court's refusal to dismiss the claim
that the due process clause required some kind of review proce-
dure for failing papers. 4 They argued that the requirement of due
79. A score of 70 was the minimum passing score. One examiner testified that he
treated the answers as a "totality" and, using 70 as the "magic passing point," gave the
answer a numerical grade depending on "the student's evidence of ability in answering
the whole." The other examiners used a more mechanical method whereby each answer
was given a certain number of points. The points were added up and the highest score
was given an "A." The other grades were curved accordingly. The court agreed with the
appellants' expert that, under the second method, "it would be almost a matter of pure
luck if the '70' thereby derived corresponded with anybody's judgment of minimal compe-
tency." Id. at 749-50.
80. Id. at 740 n. 14.
81. Id. at 750.
82. Id. at 751.
83. Id. at 752.
84. The district court had abstained from hearing the due process issue until it had
been presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 746.
1977]
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process was satisfied because the applicants who fail have an
opportunity to take the exam again and, if one did have the
necessary skills, that fact would be shown on a reexamination. 5
The court rejected this argument noting that the delay and ex-
pense of taking the bar exam could be burdensome. In addition,
the court pointed out that South Carolina allowed only three
attempts to pass the bar whereas in states where reexamination
had been found sufficient to meet the demands of due process,
applicants were allowed to take the test as many times as they
desired."
B. Pregnancy Leave
On December 7, 1976, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert."7 The
opinion answered several crucial questions in the area of employ-
ment sex discrimination. In doing so, however, it raised several
others. Thus, although the Court held that an employer's exclu-
sion of pregnancy benefits from a company disability insurance
program was not discrimination within the meaning of title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,88 it left open to speculation
whether nonrenewal of a teaching contract because a teacher had
become pregnant would be considered a violation of the Act. This
question is squarely posed by the case of Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees of Pickens County District "A. "I'
In Mitchell, the plaintiff schoolteacher brought an action in
the District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging that
the Board of Trustees of Pickens County School District "A" had
denied her due process and equal protection by failing to renew
her contract solely because she had become pregnant. She also
claimed that the nonrenewal constituted a violation of title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.90
The plaintiff, in early April, 1972, discovered that she was
85. The examiners relied on the cases of Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976), and Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners,
504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, Review of Failing Bar Examina-
tions: Does Reexamination Satisfy Due Process?, 52 B.U.L. REv. 286 (1972).
86. 540 F.2d at 752 n.20. After the suit was begun, as the court noted, South Carolina
voluntarily instituted procedures to review failing papers. Id. at n.19.
87. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
88. 97 S. Ct. at 413.
89. 415 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1976).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
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pregnant. She informed her principal of this fact before the date
for negotiating contracts for the following year. Having consulted
with a physician and being informed that delivery would take
place on or about November 6, 1972, the plaintiff arranged with
her principal to remain at work until around November 1, 1972,
after which she planned to be absent until January 1, 1973. This
arrangement was not approved by the district superintendent,
and his decision not to renew the plaintiff's contract for the 1972-
73 school year was affirmed by the Board of Trustees.'
The district court found that the defendants' decision not to
renew the contract was made in good faith. This finding was
based on the fact that the school district maintained a policy of
refusing to hire applicants who would not commit themselves to
a full school year or who anticipated not being able to work the
entire contract year. The reason given by the defendants for this
policy was that allowing "forseeable periods of extended absence,
would disrupt the continuity of the educational and instructional
process.
'9 2
The defendants argued that the existence of this general pol-
icy showed that the decision not to renew was not based on the
plaintiff's sex, but rather upon a legitimate interest in furthering
the education of the district's students.9 3 The district court an-
swered this contention by citing the decision of the Fourth Circuit
in Gilbert: "It is of no moment that an employer may not have
deliberately intended sex-related discrimination: the statute
looks to 'consequences,' not intent. . ." and concluded that the
"consequence" of "defendants' actions in the instant case re-
sulted in the denial of a teaching job to plaintiff solely because
of pregnancy."95
Even if the failure to renew the contract did operate so as to
discriminate against women, the defendants argued further, such
discrimination comes within the exception provided in the law,
which allows employers to use sex as a criterion where it consti-
tutes "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
91. 415 F. Supp. at 515-16.
92. Brief for Defendants at 12.
93. See 415 F. Supp. at 517.
94. Id. (citing Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 97 S.
Ct. 401 (1976)).
95. 415 F. Supp. at 518.
1977]
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prise." ' The court also disagreed with this position, finding that,
in light of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,7 "excluding
pregnant women from teaching jobs is [not] necessary to the
normal operation of a school.""8
Finally, the defendants relied on Geduldig v. Aiello99 for the
proposition that "not every classification concerning pregnancy is
a sex-biased classification; and absent a showing that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invid-
ious discrimination against the member of one sex or the other
there can be no valid claim of sex discrimination."'0 0 This lan-
guage is from the controversial footnote 20 in Geduldig where
Justice Stewart asserted that the classification in question-the
State of California had excluded pregnancy benefits from its disa-
bility insurance program-was not based on sex since the two
groups involved were "pregnant women and non-pregnant per-
sons" and pointed out that "[w]hile the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes. . ... ,0 The
district court held this language inapplicable since Geduldig was
a case involving a constitutional claim rather than one based
partially on title VII as in the instant case."0 2 It cited the following
language from the Fourth Circuit's Gilbert opinion to buttress its
conclusion:
The test in [Geduldig] was legislative reasonableness. Title
VII, however, authorizes no such "rationality" test in determin-
ing the propriety of its application. It represents a flat and abso-
lute prohibition against all sex discrimination on conditions of
employment. It is not concerned with whether the discrimina-
tion is "invidious" or not. It outlaws all sex discrimination in the
conditions of employment.' 3
The court concluded that the school district had violated
title VII by failing to renew the plaintiff's contract. Instead of
granting the plaintiff relief, however, the court granted the defen-
dants' motion for relief from judgment pending the Supreme
96. Id.
97, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
98. 415 F. Supp. at 518.
99. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
100. 415 F. Supp. at 519.
101. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
102. 415 F. Supp. at 519.
103. Id.
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Court's decision in Gilbert since that case might have
"decide[d] controlling issues."'' 4
Now the Supreme Court has decided Gilbert. It relied heav-
ily on Geduldig in reaching the conclusion that denial of preg-
nancy benefits in a company insurance program is not sex dis-
crimination. 5 To overcome the assertion of the Fourth Circuit
that Geduldig does not apply to title VII cases, Justice Rehnquist
observed:
While there is no necessary inference that Congress . . .in-
tended to incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimina-
tion which have evolved from court decisions construing the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
similarities between the congressional language and some of
those decisions surely indicates that the latter are a useful start-
ing point in interpreting the former.' 6
Geduldig, because of its "strikingly similar" facts, was held to be
"quite relevant."'0 7 So Gilbert reaffirmed the reasoning in
Geduldig that denial of pregnancy benefits in a disability insur-
ance plan is not sex discrimination since it does not apply to all
women but merely to pregnant women. Gilbert also extended this
reasoning to title VII cases.' 8
However, it is impossible to extend the reasoning in Gilbert
to a case such as Mitchell. In Gilbert the Court focused on the
benefits which accrued to each sex under the insurance plan and
determined that the effect of the plan's underinclusiveness was
non-discriminatory: 09 "There is no risk from which men are pro-
tected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not.""' In Mitchell, however,
there is no similar program of benefits on which to focus. One
104. Id. at 520-21.
105. See 97 S. Ct. at 407-10.
106. Id. at 407.
107. Id.
108. Justice Rehnquist, in applying Geduldig to title VII cases, said:
The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in concluding that the reasoning of
Geduldig was not applicable to an action under Title VII. Since it is a finding
of sex-based discrimination that must trigger, in a case such as this, the finding
of an unlawful employment practice under [title VIII, Geduldig is precisely in
point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits
plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all.
Id. at 408.
109. See id. at 414 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
1977]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
must focus on the disadvantage that the school district's policy
places on women. Since a similar disadvantage is not placed on
men, the only conclusion that one can reach is that the district's
policy of not renewing the contracts of women who have become
pregnant has the effect of discriminating against women.
There is another significant point which demonstrates that
Gilbert should not extend to invalidate the plaintiff's claim in
Mitchell. The Supreme Court in Gilbert did not overrule
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur which involved facts
very similar to those in Mitchell. Although LaFleur was decided
on due process grounds, Justice Powell concurred on equal protec-
tion grounds."' Since Justice Powell found himself able to join the
majority opinion in Gilbert, there is strong indication that the
Court's failure to find discrimination in that case should be lim-
ited to a context of disability insurance benefits and not extended
to situations such as the one in Mitchell."2
Paul E. Tinkler
111. See 414 U.S. 632, 652 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. After Gilbert, the court reversed its ruling. 46 U.S.L.W. 2112 (D.S.C., filed
July 27, 1977).
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